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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the degree of bank competition in Hungary on various submarkets. An 
overview of stylised facts on the market structure, pricing behaviour and entry barriers suggests 
that the degree of competition may be rather different in the individual submarkets. Looking at 
the pricing practice of Hungarian banks, a possible use of market power may be conjectured in 
consumer lending. By contrast, it may be presumed that competitive pricing prevails in the 
corporate lending market. We prove our assumption by using the Bresnahan model, which 
belongs to the non-structural approaches of measuring competition. We conducted our empirical 
investigation using different measures of output, i.e. interest-bearing assets, loans, interest-bearing 
liabilities and deposits, for the period between December 1996 and September 2003. In respect 
of consumer loans, we analysed a panel sample for a shorter time horizon, i.e. the period between 
March 2001 and September 2003. Based on our results, it is safe to assume that the degree of 
competition in the loan and deposit markets falls between perfect competition and the Cournot 
equilibrium. In contrast, the consumer credit market is characterised by a much lower degree of 
competition, i.e. between Cournot equilibrium and perfect collusion. In addition to measuring 
competition, we attempted to determine losses in consumer surplus caused by banks, as well as 
the degree of the market power (measured by the Lerner index).  
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 1 Introduction 
 
The Hungarian banking system has undergone significant transformation during its relatively 
short history. Of the major structural changes, the dominance of foreign ownership and a 
substantial degree of deconcentration, concomitant with the natural evolution of the banking 
market, deserve mention. In addition to a large number of foreign entries, other trends have also 
pointed to increasing competition over the past decade and a half. Such trends include, for 
example, the growing importance of cross-border lending in corporate finance (due to the 
presence of multinational companies) and an increasing market share of non-bank financial 
intermediaries in household savings. A substantial shrinkage of the net interest margin in the 
second half of the 1990s also indicated increasingly fierce competition. It should be noted, 
however, that narrowing margins may also reflect other important impacts such as a considerable 
decrease in risk premia (due to macro-economic stabilisation), a fall in the reserve requirement 
ratio, disinflation and improved cost efficiency.2 
 
Increasingly intense competition in the banking market is reflected not only in lower margins, but 
also in the non-price factors of competition. The latter include a dynamic expansion in the range 
of banking products and services (in the household segment in particular), the modernisation of 
branch networks, the spreading of alternative distribution channels and the emergence of more 
sophisticated risk management systems. These factors had a beneficial effect on welfare through 
improving the availability and quality of banking services to customers. 
  
Nevertheless, there are also signs suggesting that the degree of competition is still not 
satisfactory. Compared to banking markets in developed economies, the net interest margin, 
although shrinking significantly, is still high in Hungary. This may be attributable not only to 
imperfect competition, but also to other factors including significant inflation differential, higher 
credit risks, differences in asset structure (a higher proportion of customer loans) and economies-
of-scale problems arising from the small size of the market. A higher interest margin is also 
attributable to the fact that the operating costs of Hungarian banks, relative to their business 
activity (i.e. compared to total assets), are still relatively high by international standards. Well 
exceeding the average of advanced European economies, the profitability of the Hungarian 
banking sector raises the possibility that domestic banks use their market power to a larger extent, 
which allows them to improve profitability without reducing their average costs more drastically.  
 
An important aspect of analysing competition in the Hungarian banking market is to find out 
whether or not banks’ behaviour, and hence the degree of competition, is different in the major 
market segments. A comparison of the market structure and banks’ pricing behaviour in the 
household and corporate segments indicates that concentration is higher and the interest margin 
is wider in the household market. This is, however, far from being a country-specific behaviour, 
since both a more concentrated structure and less competitive pricing have general underlying 
economic causes. One is that barriers to entry into the retail market are higher, i.e. this market 
segment is less contestable, due primarily to the need for and the high costs associated with the 
establishment of branch networks. Moreover, higher switching costs and spatial differentiation 
play a more dominant role, which, in turn, may serve as a source of pricing power for banks in 
the retail market. Although banks in Hungary earn a relatively high margin on household loans 
and deposits, compared to their counterparts in developed economies in Europe, the extent to 
                                                 
2 Empirical studies also provide support for the importance of these factors in developments in the margin. For a 
large country sample, see Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) and for CEEC’s Móré and Nagy (2003).  
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which this can be ascribed to higher risks, costs and inflation and even less fierce competition can 
only be identified empirically.  
 
Based on the above overview, we may well arrive at the conclusion that, though the overall 
degree of competition has increased significantly over the past decade, the actual degree of 
competition in individual submarkets remains unidentified. In order to measure this we adopt the 
Bresnahan model, which belongs to the non-structural methods of measuring competition. 
Another major issue is the amount of oligopolistic rents that banks may have earned in the 
individual market segments, i.e. the extent to which they have exploited their market power.  
 
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides stylised facts on the structure of the 
Hungarian banking market and banks’ pricing behaviour, paying special attention to the 
differences between the corporate and the household market. Furthermore, we also discuss other 
major factors influencing competition, focussing on the role of entry barriers and non-price 
factors. In section 3, following a brief overview of empirical methods, we adopt the Bresnahan 
model to assess the degree of competition in the Hungarian banking market. Then we attempt to 
gauge the amount of welfare loss arising from imperfect competition, as well as the degree of 
market power (the Lerner index). Section 4 summarises the results and puts them in an 
international context. It also draws some major conclusions. 
 
2 Main characteristics of  the structure of  the Hungarian banking market 
and pricing behaviour 
2.1 Structural features of the Hungarian banking market  
2.1.1 Major structural developments and differences between the individual market 
segments  
 
Virtually throughout the 1990s, the concentration of the Hungarian banking market was 
constantly decreasing as a natural consequence of market evolution, with the number of banks 
increasing dynamically. The number of market players grew by 40% between 1990 and 1997, with 
a simultaneous fall from over 1,800 to approximately 1,000 in the concentration index.3 As to the 
number of banks, the final years of the 1990s witnessed the signs of a consolidation process 
similar to that in the EU: in spite of new market entries, the number of banks4 fell by 16% 
between 1997 and 2003. The underlying reasons for this include primarily mergers, and a few 
instances of small foreign banks’ withdrawing from the market or banks going bankrupt.5  
 
Developments in market concentration during the same period are, however, less unambiguous 
in indicating the start of the consolidation process. Although the downward trend of market 
concentration halted temporarily in 2001, later it continued, albeit at a more moderate pace. As a 
result, the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI), calculated on the basis of total assets, fell to 
approximately 900 by 2003. It should be noted, however, that the institutional structure of 
mortgage lending and the subsidised house purchase scheme also contributed to the decline in 
concentration in 2002 and 2003.6 If mortgage banks and their parent banks are consolidated, the 
                                                 
3 Calculated on the basis of total assets. 
4 MFB and Eximbank included. However, in calculating concentration indices, we disregarded them. 
5 Between 1997 and 2003 there were 10 mergers. In two cases the acquisition of assets and business lines influenced 
concentration to a certain degree, but left the number of market participants unaffected. 
6 The dynamic expansion in mortgage lending occurred in rather a concentrated manner in the Hungarian banking 
sector, where the mortgage bank of the market leader bank acquired a dominant market share. As the establishment 
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2001 increase in concentration can no longer be considered as temporary, since the rise in the 
adjusted HHI also continued in 2002 and 2003 (see Chart 1). 
 
Chart 1 Number of banks and concentration in the Hungarian banking market 
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Sources: MNB, authors’ calculations. 
 
Similarly to trends in the EU, consolidation was unaccompanied by a decline in the number of 
branch offices. On the contrary, relative to 1997, when the number of banks began to diminish, 
the size of branch networks even increased somewhat. Nevertheless, branch density is still low by 
international standards: the number of bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants is 0.11, which is only 
half of what it is in the banking systems with the lowest branch density in the EU. In addition, 
along with a rapid spread of cash substitutes, the network of alternative (physical) distribution 
channels has been expanding vigorously since the mid-1990s. Compared to 1995, the number of 
ATMs increased by 4.5 times, totalling almost 3,000 at year-end 2003. The number of POS 
devices for cash withdrawal purposes and retail transactions also grew very robustly, by over 
550% and nearly 650% respectively, relative to 1997.  
  
Analysing the individual submarkets, the degree of concentration in corporate lending did not 
change materially in the second half of the 1990s, with the HHI remaining broadly flat at the low 
levels (approximately 700) that evolved after a rapid deconcentration in the first half of the 1990s. 
Recent years have seen a reversal in this trend, owing mainly to mergers in 2001, with the 
concentration index rising to 1,000 by 2003. Concentration in the household deposit market 
continued to decrease even in the period after 2000, albeit at a much slower pace than earlier. 
From 2000, judging by the adjusted HHI, the trend of deconcentration in household lending 
reversed, due predominantly to the explosive rise experienced in the concentration in housing 
loans (see Chart 2). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of mortgage banks was fuelled by interest rate subsidy maximisation, and given that mortgage bank subsidiaries and 
parent banks constitute, in essence, one business unit, it stands to reason that they should be treated as one when the 
concentration index is calculated. 
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Chart 2 Concentration in the individual submarkets (HHI) 
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Sources: MNB, authors’ calculations. 
 
Despite the convergence between market segments in recent years, concentration in the 
household market has remained much higher than in the corporate market. Whereas the HHI is 
still standing at around 1,000 in corporate lending in spite of the recent increase, it is 2,400 in 
household lending as a whole and over 3,400 in the market of housing loans accounting for the 
bulk of household loans.7 Consumer credit and other loans, the concentration of which dropped 
close to 1,000 following a trend of decrease over the past years, seem to be an exception to the 
typically more uneven size structure of household markets. 
 
It should be borne in mind, however, that consumer credit and other (non-housing) household 
loans constitute rather a heterogeneous (i.e. differentiated) group of banking products according 
to purpose or risk characteristics. Thus, concentration indicators calculated for the entire market 
segment may prove misleading. Currently there are only two or three major participants in the 
main product markets (e.g. hire purchase loans, personal loans, car loans and overdraft facilities), 
with dominant banks varying from one product to the next. As a consequence, concentration is 
much higher in the individual product markets. The concentration index8 for hire purchase loans, 
personal loans and overdraft facilities was respectively around 3,400, 2,900 and 6,700 at end-
2002. Given that substitutability between these products is incomplete, this concentrated 
structure may enable banks to use their market power in pricing.  
 
The difference between concentration in the household and corporate markets is also extremely 
marked in respect of deposits. Of all the market segments under review, corporate deposit taking 
is the least concentrated, with the HHI amounting to slightly over 800. By contrast, the 
concentration index for household deposits exceeds 2,100. Within this, the concentration of 
household current account and sight deposits is even higher (over 3,100). In addition to housing 
loans and household deposits, concentration is also extremely high in the card business, where 
                                                 
7 Also judging from the concentration index adjusted with mortgage bank subsidiaries. 
8 For 2003, no data available on consumer loans by product breakdown. Concentration in car purchase loans is also 
high, but car finance banks also compete with leasing firms. In fact, the latter account for the larger part of car 
financing. It follows then that concentration in car purchase loans originated by banks is less relevant for the 
competitiveness of this product market. 
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the HHI is over 5,000 (based on the volume of transactions concluded with domestically issued 
cards).  
 
Some authors argue that differences between the market shares of major banks can describe 
market structure better than can concentration indices (Molyneux, 1993). In addition to measures 
of concentration, the difference between the market share of the market leading bank and that of 
the second largest bank clearly illustrates the strikingly different structures of the household and 
corporate markets. While this difference varies from 15% to 48% in the individual household 
market segments, it is a mere 1%–1.5% in the market of corporate loans and deposits. 
 
2.1.2 Causes of higher concentration in the household market 
 
Higher concentration in the household market is attributable predominantly to differences in the 
initial market structures. An important characteristic of the banking systems in transition economies 
is that the market has not evolved as the result of organic development. In these countries in the 
era of command economy, in addition to a monobank that functioned both as a central bank and 
a commercial bank, there was also a savings bank specialising in the collection of household 
deposits and a bank responsible for foreign trade finance. In the period preceding the 
establishment of the two-tier banking system, a few joint venture banks had also been founded in 
Hungary, in order to provide services for mainly foreign-owned companies. 
 
Accordingly, there were even significant differences in the initial market structure between the 
corporate and household business. While, at the outset, the market of corporate loans and 
deposits was oligopolistic (with the dominance of three state-owned banks), that of retail banking 
services was monopolistic. In other words, ‘first mover advantage’ in the household market was 
greater, which had a profound impact on the later distribution of market positions. Analysing the 
period between 1972 and 2002, Berger and Dick (2004) find evidence for the first mover 
advantage, claiming that the later banks enter the market, the smaller their respective market 
shares are, compared to those of early movers.9 In the case of Hungary, the impact of the 
inherited structure is primarily reflected in the household deposit and housing loan markets. 
 
Obviously, differences in the structure of the household and the corporate markets cannot be 
attributed solely to those in the initial structure. This is, indeed, why it is important to study 
developments in the contestability of markets in the individual market segments, i.e. whether 
there were any such barriers to entry that are likely to have contributed to the preservation of 
existing differences in the structure of the individual submarkets. Retail banking markets are 
generally reckoned to be less contestable due to higher entry barriers than corporate markets. The 
most important barrier to entry in the household market is the necessity of and the large costs 
implied in establishing branch networks (see, for example, Dick, 2003).  
 
In the first half of the 1990s, a number of foreign banks entered the Hungarian banking market. 
However, they mainly targeted the corporate business. They managed to reduce their average 
costs through gaining economies of scale, on account of large-volume corporate lending. 
Furthermore, as they had no ‘inherited’ bad portfolios and adopted more state-of-the-art risk 
management practices, they were able to offer more competitive prices and, hence, acquired 
larger market shares. In contrast, due to the costliness of setting up branch networks, the 
                                                 
9 At first sight, this empirical result sounds as if it stated the obvious. However, theories on market entry do not 
confirm early mover advantage unequivocally. Early entry may affect later market positions neutrally or even 
negatively, owing to the following factors: late movers may be able to use more advanced technologies, and the cost 
of entry may also change with times.  
 9
establishment of the household business is a project that only breaks even over the long term. 
This meant an effective entry barrier for potential entrants, while offering a competitive edge to 
incumbents. Initially focussing their activities on the corporate sector, foreign banks did not 
provided en masse household services for a long time, and they only targeted upper income 
groups of households. Accordingly, their strategies only included organic growth and a few minor 
acquisitions for a prolonged period. However, declining profitability in the corporate business 
urged these banks to shift focus. Recently, several banks have decided to pursue a more 
aggressive strategy in the retail market, which foreshadows increasingly fierce competition in this 
market segment. 
 
Developments in competitive conditions in the housing loan market in recent years clearly 
illustrate the role of branch networks as a barrier to entry in the retail market. As the massive 
dominance of subsidised housing loans left limited room for price competition, the pace of 
market acquisition mainly hinged on the extensiveness of branch networks.10 Accordingly, the 
explosive growth in mortgage lending occurred in a rather concentrated manner in 2002 and 
2003. 
 
In addition to the costliness of establishing branch networks, the acute presence of problems arising 
from asymmetric information in household lending may also be a major barrier to entry. A group of 
creditworthy clients (e.g. multinational and resident large firms) emerged sooner in the corporate 
than in the household sector, where debtors have shorter credit histories. Furthermore, as regards 
lending to households, banks seem to share information to a much lesser extent. In particular, in 
contrast with the corporate sector, there is still no credit bureau with records of all the debtors. 
As a consequence, dominant market players in household lending have a competitive edge in 
terms of information, which further impedes their competitors’ faster market acquisition. 
 
2.1.3 The structure of the banking market in an international comparison 
 
Based on total assets, the concentration of the Hungarian banking market is at a medium level in 
comparison with EU-15 countries, with the combined market share of the five largest banks 
amounting to 59% (in 2002) (see Chart 3).11 When making such comparisons, it is important to 
bear in mind that the size of a country (market) correlates with the degree of market 
concentration negatively. Accordingly, market concentration in Hungary is comparable to smaller 
EU-15 member states. Compared to CEECs, concentration in the Hungarian banking market 
only exceeds that in the Polish banking market. 
 
                                                 
10 Furthermore, it is important to note that only one bank had had experience in housing finance before. 
11 Calculated on the basis of the banking sector’s total assets, HHI reveals that the relative position of the Hungarian 
banking system is similar in comparison to the EU15 countries.  
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Chart 3 Combined market share of the five largest banks compared to EU-15 countries 
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Sources: ECB, MNB. 
 
However, when comparing the difference between the market share of the two largest banks 
across the CEECs (for 2001), a slightly different picture emerges with respect to the relative 
position of the Hungarian banking sector within the region in terms of competitive conditions. 
While the difference between the market share of the first and the second largest bank was below 
5% in three countries (the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia), it was 11% in Hungary and well 
over 20% in Slovenia. 
 
In respect of the market structure of the individual submarkets, comparative data are only 
available for CEECs (see Table 1). A comparison of the 2002 H1 concentration indices in 
corporate and household lending reveals that concentration is higher in the latter in all CEECs, 
with the difference being larger than in Hungary only in Slovakia. A partial explanation for higher 
concentration in household lending in the entire region is that household lending took off much 
later in these countries. By contrast, corporate lending is already a relatively mature market. 
 
Table 1 Concentration in corporate and household lending in CEE 5 
 Corporate 
lending 
Household 
lending 
Czech Republic 1,127 1,469 
Poland 744 1,140 
Slovakia 949 3,098 
Slovenia 1,668 1,779 
Hungary 955 1,714 
Source: National central banks. 
 
2.2 Pricing behaviour o  banks f
 
The interest margin is one of the simplest indicators of the degree of competition. Its usability in 
analysing competition is, however, heavily restricted by the fact that it contains the impact of a 
number of other factors. As a starting point, however, we believe that it is important to provide 
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an overview of recent developments in interest margin and the factors (e.g. market structure, 
risks, inflation and the reserve ratio) affecting it. We then go on to summarise the theoretical 
factors that may provide an explanation for the relatively high interest margin in Hungary, paying 
special attention to the household segment. An important aspect of banks’ pricing behaviour is to 
what extent and how quickly they adjust lending and deposit rates in response to changes in 
market rates. As the extent and speed of interest rate pass-through is a better indicator than 
simple interest margin indicators (Gual, 2004), we also assess the results of tests on interest rate 
pass-through in the Hungarian banking system. 
  
2.2.1 Developments in factors determining net interest margin 
 
The net interest margin was declining constantly in Hungary during the second half of the 1990s. 
In 2000, however, the net interest margin stopped narrowing and stabilised around 4%, which is 
rather high in international comparison.12 Developments in the degree of competition can only be 
inferred indirectly from changes over time in the interest margin. A decline in risk premium, 
disinflation and reserve ratio all contributed to shrinking margins (see Chart 4). This is suggested 
by the fact that the proportion of non-performing loans, inflation and the reserve ratio are all in a 
close positive correlation with the interest margin. Nevertheless, caution is warranted in assessing 
any causal link since each variable experienced a negative trend. The shift in the structure of bank 
assets has had a beneficial impact on the net interest margin, since the proportion of loans, in 
particular that of higher margin household loans recently, has increased significantly.  
 
However, costs, another major component of pricing, moved in the opposite direction to 
margins in the middle of the period under review (1996–1999). This period saw the 
implementation of large-scale IT and network development projects, concomitant with the 
development of retail business, which raised the cost level in the banking system. Weak negative 
correlation (-0.18%) calculated for this period suggests that cost developments are unlikely to 
account for the narrowing of the interest margin. 
 
                                                 
12 Net interest margin is the ratio of net interest income to average total assets. 
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Chart 4 The net interest margin and its main determinants 
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Chart 5 Interest margin and market concentration in the Hungarian banking system 
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A closer look at the relationship between market structure and pricing reveals that the narrowing 
of margins was accompanied by decreasing concentration (see Chart 5).13 This suggests that 
increasing competition may have also played a role in the narrowing of the interest margin, in 
addition to a decline in risks, inflation and the costs of complying with minimum reserve 
requirements. It should be noted, however, that the adjusted concentration index moved in the 
opposite direction to that of the interest margin in 2002 and 2003. 
 
                                                 
13 If, allowing for mortgage bank subsidiaries, we examine the adjusted concentration index, the correlation is 
somewhat weaker due to different movements in 2002 and 2003.  
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2.2.2 Net interest margin in international comparison 
 
In spite of the shrinkage over the past decade, the net interest margin is still high by international 
standards. Based on 2002 data, the average interest margin of Hungarian banks exceeded the 
average of EU15 and even CEEC-5 countries, by 2.6 percentage points and 1 percentage point 
respectively. For the purposes of our study it is important to identify the market segments where 
Hungarian banks can earn this relatively high margin. A comparison of margins in submarkets 
with those in the euro area reveals that the main reason for this is that margins are higher in the 
case of both household loans and deposits, and corporate deposits (see Table 2).14 This difference 
is particularly striking in the case of consumer credit. In contrast, lending margins on corporate 
loans are lower than the euro area average, which points to competitive behaviour in this market 
segment. 
 
 
Table 2 Lending and deposit margins in comparison with the euro area (percentage 
points, 2003)15 
 Euro 
area 
Hungary 
Corporate loans (< EUR 1 M) 2.0 1.9 
Corporate loans (> EUR 1 M) 1.0 0.4 
Corporate deposits 0.1 1.4 
Consumer credit 5.1 11.7 
Household loans 0.2 1.9 
Sources: ECB, MNB. 
 
Looking at margins between lending and deposit rates, a striking difference emerges between the 
corporate and household segments. While the margin between corporate lending and deposit 
rates, depending on loan size is only 0.7 to 1.2 percentage points higher in Hungary than the euro 
area average, the differential between consumer credit and household deposit rates exceeds it by 
8.3 percentage points. 
 
2.2.3 Possible causes of high household margins 
 
A comparison of margins by submarkets indicates that, relative to developed banking systems in 
Europe, Hungarian banks may have larger market power in the household segment. It should be 
borne in mind, however, that in addition to imperfect competition, a number of other factors 
may also explain the high margins between household lending and deposit rates. What follows is 
a list of possible causes:16 
 
                                                 
14 The very small margin on corporate and household deposits in the EU may be somewhat surprising. Most recent 
studies prove that deposit markets are highly competitive in the EU. Studying nine EU countries, Bikker (2003) 
found that, except for two countries, the hypothesis of perfect competition cannot be ruled out. (This applies to an 
earlier period, though.) 
15Lending margins are calculated on loans with an initial rate fixation of less than 1 year, deposit margins are 
calculated on deposits with a maturity of less than 1 year. Lending margin: lending rate–money market rate. Deposit 
margin: money market rate–deposit rate. Interest margin was calculated on the basis of 3-month EURIBOR and 
BUBOR. Data denote annual averages. 
16 This overview does not cover such general factors (e.g. inflation, cost efficiency and reserve ratio) that provide 
similar explanations for higher-than-euro-area average margins in both segments. 
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- Higher risk premia. Household lending is a relatively new market in Hungary.17 Hence, the fact 
that banks do not have sufficient information on their debtors’ creditworthiness, i.e. that their 
retail clients only have a short credit history, adds to the risks facing banks in this segment. 
This information asymmetry is further exacerbated by the fact that, contrary to the practice 
adopted in the case of non-financial corporations, only borrowers in default are registered in 
the debtor information system on individuals (‘negative list’). 
- A smaller size of the household segment. Empirical studies show that the relative size of the 
banking market (i.e. financial depth) correlates negatively with interest margins. When 
corporate and household lending are compared, in terms of depth, the household market still 
lags far behind the corporate market, despite households’ recent rapidly growing 
indebtedness. The corporate loans-to-GDP ratio is approximately half the euro-area average, 
whereas the household loans-to-GDP ratio is only one-third of that. 
- Clients’ low interest rate sensitivity. Consumer loans may provide a good example of retail 
customers’ low interest rate sensitivity. Demand for consumer credit remained strong despite 
extremely high nominal interest rates (and APRC). Paradoxical as it may seem, newly granted 
consumer loans and APRC correlate positively between 1998 and 2003 (MNB, 2004). 
Possible underlying motives for rising demand included the establishment of and 
improvement in the supply-side conditions of consumer lending, hence the easing of liquidity 
constraints. This suggests that, given the relatively low amount of instalments, for the time 
being, most clients seem to pay little attention to high interest and additional costs. 
- Lack of market pricing in mortgage lending. Recent years have seen an unequivocal dominance of 
subsidised housing loans in mortgage lending. Accordingly, it is changes in the subsidy 
scheme rather than market mechanisms that have determined the pricing of housing loans 
recently. As mortgage lending has a short history, no satisfactory amount of information is 
available on the loss ratio typical of the Hungarian market. In the absence of relevant 
information, it is difficult to judge the extent to which high lending margins (first 7%–8%, 
then 4%–5%) prior to end-2003 can be attributed to higher risks, or whether they can be 
considered to be extra profit generated by a generous subsidy scheme.18  
- Lower degree of disintermediation. A relatively high interest margin on household deposits may 
also be attributable to the fact that, in spite of a marked pick-up, non-bank savings, which 
compete with bank deposits, are still less popular in Hungary than in advanced European 
economies.  
- Higher level of cross-subsidisation. The fact that the pricing of certain retail banking services is 
reflected in lower deposit rates rather than in commissions or fees may also have contributed 
to relatively high household deposit margins (cross-subsidisation). It should be noted, 
however, that a gradual increase in the weight of commission and fee income and a 
substantial (higher-than-inflation) rise in the costs of providing certain financial transaction 
services for households point to a recent weakening of cross-subsidisation. At the same time, 
however, non-interest type charges (e.g. bank account maintenance fees) in Hungary are still 
lower than in the EU; expected convergence may lead to an increase in such charges (in 
contrast with an anticipated shrinkage in the interest margin). 
 
2.2.4 Interest rate pass-through and market power 
 
The extent and speed of interest rate pass-through may indirectly indicate the degree of 
competition. For the purposes of this study, it is highly important to ascertain whether or not 
there are significant differences in the transmission between money market rates and bank rates 
                                                 
17 A take-off in consumer lending and housing finance began in the late 1990s and 2001 respectively. 
18 Modifications in the decree on subsidies in December 2003 signalled a shift towards the increased importance of 
market mechanisms in pricing housing loans.  
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in the individual submarkets. The degree of competition in the banking sector may affect the 
extent and speed of interest rate pass-through, i.e. intense competition among banks will result in 
a more flexible adjustment of borrowing and deposit rates.  
 
The empirical results on Hungary (Horváth-Krekó-Naszódi, 2004) show that corporate loan rates 
adjust to changes in market rates fully and the most quickly. The adjustment is only partial in the 
remaining market segments, with consumer credit rates and short-term household deposit rates 
appearing to be particularly sticky. Thus, the results of the pass-through test suggest that 
competition in the household segments, as regards consumer credit in particular, is much weaker. 
The short-term adjustment of short-term corporate loan rates is rapid even by international 
standards; that of consumer rates is, however, strikingly inflexible.  
 
Nevertheless, when adopting the pass-through test as an indirect indicator of competition, it is 
important to allow for the fact that there may be a number of such causes of interest rate rigidity 
that do not necessarily reflect the lack of competition (Gual, 2004).  
 
- Lending rates may also be inflexible due to information asymmetry and adverse selection 
problems. Therefore, banks can only raise lending rates to a lesser extent relative to money 
market rates for fear of deterioration in their loan portfolio quality. 
- Risk premia may be a relatively more important determinant of prices in the case of high-risk 
lending products (e.g. credit cards and consumer credit); consequently, prices may respond 
less sensitively to changes in market rates. 
- High switching costs may contribute to the stickiness of interest rates significantly. 
- Finally, menu costs may be an additional cause of interest rate rigidity. 
 
2.3 Summary assessment of market structure, pricing and other factors of competition 
 
Analysing the structural characteristics of the Hungarian banking sector, we can assert that the 
medium level concentration, on the basis of total assets, reflects rather different size structures 
across individual market segments. Despite recent convergence in the individual submarkets, 
concentration in the household segments, housing finance and household deposits in particular, 
is still much higher than in the corporate segments.  
 
Assessing the pricing behaviour of Hungarian banks from the perspective of developments in the 
interest margin, it seems that, compared to the European average, spreads are relatively much 
wider in the household business, especially in the case of household deposits and consumer 
lending.19 Furthermore, lending and deposit rates adjust to changes in market rates more quickly 
and more fully in the corporate segments. Consumer lending rates adjust rather rigidly even by 
international standards.  
 
In addition to market structure, there are other factors which may significantly influence banks’ 
behaviour, the most important being barriers to entry. According to the theory of contestable 
markets, even with a low number of market participants (or high concentration), competitive 
behaviour may prevail if market entry is easy and the expenses of market entry can be recovered 
upon exit (i.e. there are no sunk costs). However, in the household segment certain entry barriers 
are still of great importance in the Hungarian banking market. Of these, the most important are 
as follows:  
 
                                                 
19 Owing to the distortion caused by widespread subsidies, the pricing of housing loans cannot be compared to that 
in advanced economies. 
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- The extent of the branch network is one of the major aspects of differentiation among banks. The 
proximity of branch offices as an indicator of service quality is traditionally one of the most 
significant non-price factors of banking competition. As the use of the various forms of 
remote banking (e.g. Internet-based banking services) is much less widespread in Hungary 
than in advanced economies, the use of the physical distribution channels (i.e. branch and 
ATM networks) remains dominant. Large-scale fixed investments, needed for a major shift in 
market positions and for challenging the dominance of the market leading bank, would incur 
high costs and take long to break even owing to the small size of the market.  
- Problems arising from information asymmetry are much more serious in household than corporate 
lending, as clients’ credit histories are much shorter in the former, the reason for this being 
that household lending only took off in the late 1990s. Moreover, information sharing among 
individual banks is much less comprehensive. Both factors make borrowers’ creditworthiness 
harder to assess, which increases switching costs, thereby raising higher entry barriers and 
providing market power to incumbents.  
 
Based on the above overview of banking market structure, pricing behaviour and barriers to 
entry, we can assume that the degree of competition may differ markedly in the corporate and 
household segments. Given Hungarian banks’ pricing practice, there may be a strong reason to 
believe that they exploit market power, especially in consumer lending.  
 
With the issue of the structure-pricing relationship addressed, the following section seeks to 
define the degree of competition by quantifying banks’ behaviour. We examine aggregate output 
(i.e. interest-bearing assets/loans, interest-bearing liabilities/deposits), while paying special 
attention to the consumer credit submarket. 
 
3 Measuring the degree of  competition in the Hungarian banking market 
3.1 A brief overview of the methods of measuring competition 
 
Based on the methods adopted in measuring competition, empirical studies on banking 
competition belong to two major schools of thought: the structural and non-structural 
approaches. The structural approach is based on the structural characteristics of the market with 
linking the degree of competition to market concentration (and the distribution of market 
shares). The non-structural method, e.g. the Panzar-Rosse method and the Bresnahan model, 
directly quantifies market participants’ behaviour, thereby determining the degree of competition. 
 
The use of the structural approach, i.e. the testing of market power hypotheses20 has yielded mixed 
results.21 The use of structural measures has also been severely criticised on the grounds of 
theoretical and methodological considerations. Criticism focused on, for example, the efficiency 
hypothesis, the theory of contestable markets, the lack of a solid theoretical foundation 
underlying SCP models, the difficulties of measurement and ignoring non-price factors, etc. (For 
an overview, see Móré and Nagy, 2003.) Based on an overview of studies testing market power 
hypotheses, it is safe to say that the structural characteristics (e.g. concentration) of the market 
alone are not satisfactory indicators of the extent to which banks’ behaviour is competitive.  
 
Criticism levelled against the structural method urged researchers to work out new empirical 
methods for measuring competition. The literature uses the umbrella term ‘new empirical 
industrial organisation’ to refer to the non-structural methods thus developed. Non-structural 
                                                 
20 Structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and relative market power (RMP) hypotheses. 
21 For a detailed overview of empirical literature, see, for example, Molyneux et al. (1996). 
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methods seek to capture banks’ behaviour directly in order to determine the degree of 
competition.  
 
Of the non-structural approaches, two methods, the Bresnahan model and the Panzar-Rosse test, 
have gained in popularity recently. The Panzar-Rosse test relies on the H statistics in assessing the 
degree of banking market competition and banks’ market power. The H value quantifies the 
extent to which changes in input prices are reflected in banks’ equilibrium revenues.22 The 
estimated H value should fall into the (-∞,1] range. In the case of monopoly or perfect collusion, 
revenues do not respond to changes in costs, or if they do, it is in the opposite direction (H ≤ 0). 
In case of monopolistic competition, revenues do not increase in proportion to costs (0< H <1), 
while in the case of perfect competition H=1. The adaptability of the Panzar-Rosse method 
presupposes that banks operate in a long-term equilibrium and banks’ performance depends on 
competitors’ moves. It further assumes that demand elasticity is larger than 1, and that cost 
structure is homogeneous.  
 
The advantage of the method, compared to the SCP model, is that there is no need for 
identifying markets in advance. Thus, possible distortions arising from any inaccurate definition 
of the relevant markets can be avoided. However, a drawback to its application is that, under 
certain circumstances, it may yield misleading results. If, for instance, the number of the banks 
included in a given sample is not fully adjusted to market conditions, results may be biased 
towards monopoly.  
 
The Bresnahan model is based on the simultaneous estimation of a market demand function and a 
price-setting equation, and is used to determine, mostly on the basis of aggregate data, the market 
power of an ‘average’ bank empirically. One of the parameters of the supply function is 
conjectural variation, λ, denoting competitor banks’ responses as expected by a given bank to an 
initial change of its own output. The degree of competition can be inferred from the estimated 
value of λ:  
 
- the possible values of the parameter can fall into the [0,1] range; in the case of perfect 
competition and monopoly, it is λ=0 and λ=1 respectively; 
- in any oligopoly, it is λ∈(0,1); in the symmetric Cournot oligopoly, it is λ=1/n, where n 
denotes the number of banks.  
 
The advantage of the Bresnahan method over the Panzar-Rosse test is that it is a more accurate 
measure of the degree of competition, i.e. it can even be compared to the Cournot oligopoly 
within the range of the two extreme values. For the purposes of this study, another major 
consideration is that only the Bresnahan model is suitable for assessing the competitive 
conditions of the various submarkets (Bikker, 2003).  
 
The application to the banking market of Bresnahan or similar types of model, which estimate 
the degree of competition using banks’ behavioural equations, started to gain ground in the 
1990s. Table 3 provides an overview of the major results of the empirical studies that use banks’ 
behavioural equations for estimating the degree of competition (see Table 3). 
 
                                                 
22 The H value is calculated on the basis of reduced revenue equations as the sum of input price elasticities of total 
bank revenue (or net interest income).  
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Table 3 An overview of the empirical studies that estimate the degree of competition 
using banks’ behavioural equations 
Authors Country Period Market Degree of competition 
Shaffer (1989) USA 1941-1975, 
1941-1983 
output: total assets perfect competition 
Shaffer (1993) Canada 1965-1989 output: total assets perfect competition 
Suominen (1994) Finland September 
1986- 
December 
1989 
loan and deposit 
markets  
utilisation of market power to 
some extent in both markets; 
less competitive behaviour in 
the deposit market 
Swank (1995) Netherlands 1957-1990 mortgage lending 
and savings deposits 
more oligopolistic than 
Cournot equilibrium in both 
markets  
Berg-Kim (1998) Norway 1990-92 retail and corporate 
lending 
retail lending: more 
oligopolistic behaviour than 
Cournot equilibrium 
(collusion); 
corporate lending: behaviour in 
between perfect competition 
and Cournot equilibrium 
Neven-Röller (1999) EU as a whole 
(an aggregate of 
7 EU countries) 
1981-1989 mortgage and 
corporate lending 
more oligopolistic (cartel like) 
than Cournot equilibrium 
Gruben-McComb 
(1999) 
Mexico April 1987-
December 
1993 
output: total assets prior to privatisation: 
competitive; post-privatisation: 
‘super competitive’ behaviour 
Barajas et al. (1999) Colombia May 1992-
August 
1996 
lending competitive  
Nakane (2001) Brazil August 
1994-
August 
2000 
lending perfect competition and perfect 
collusion ruled out 
Toolsema (2002) The Netherlands January 
1993-
August 
1999 
consumer lending perfect competition 
Coccorese (2002) 
 
Italy 1988-2000 lending between perfect competition 
and Cournot equilibrium 
Bikker (2003) EU as a whole 
and 9 EU 
countries23  
 
1976-1998 
(varies 
from one 
country to 
the next) 
loan and deposit 
markets  
EU as a whole: competitive 
behaviour in both markets 
EU countries: the hypothesis of 
perfect competition cannot be 
ruled out in the loan market of 
4 countries and the deposit 
market of 6 countries24 
Várhegyi (2003) Hungary 1995-2002 lending between perfect competition 
and Cournot equilibrium 
 
Of the general conclusions of those empirical studies that identify the degree of competition by 
quantifying banks’ behaviour, the following should be highlighted:  
                                                 
23 Belgium, the UK, France, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
24 Loan market: perfect or high degree of competition in Belgium, France, The Netherlands and Italy. The degree of 
competition is between perfect competition and Cournot equilibrium in Germany, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The 
Cournot equilibrium cannot be rejected in the case of the UK loan market. 
Deposit market: perfect or high degree of competition in the UK, France, The Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and 
Sweden. The degree of competition is between perfect competition and Cournot equilibrium in Spain. The Cournot 
equilibrium cannot be rejected in the case of the German deposit market. 
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- Measuring competition with the Bresnahan method in the various market segments clearly 
shows that the degree of competition may vary across submarkets even within one country. 
In Norway, Berg and Kim (1998) identified oligopolistic behaviour in retail lending and 
competitive behaviour in corporate lending. As regards the banking sector in The 
Netherlands, a number of studies have been carried out on different market segments. While 
Swank (1995) found considerable market power in mortgage lending and the savings deposit 
market, Toolsema (2002) identified perfect competition in consumer lending.  
- Another major consideration in interpreting results is to what extent estimates of the degree 
of competition are in line with the size of market power expected on the basis of 
concentration indexes. A number of studies (e.g. Shaffer, 1993 and Berg-Kim, 1998) adopting 
the Bresnahan method reached the conclusion that high market concentration did not 
necessarily go hand in hand with non-competitive behaviour, and that an increase of 
concentration in time was not inevitably accompanied by weakening competition (e.g. 
Angelini-Cetorelli, 1999).  
- Another major aspect of measuring competition involves the development over time in the 
degree of competition, particularly in the light of whether or not competition increased in the 
wake of deregulation that began in the 1980s or, more specifically, following the 
establishment of the European single market. The majority of the results support the view 
that the dismantling of regulatory (or other entry) barriers has resulted in increased 
competition. For Canada, see Shaffer (1993), for Mexico, Gruben and McComb (1999), for 
EU mortgage lending, Neven and Röller (1999) and for the banking sector in Italy, Angelini 
and Cetorelli (1999). The only exception is Suominen’s study (1994). Examining the Finnish 
banking sector, he arrived at the surprising conclusion that, while intense competition had 
been common in the pre-deregulation era, a certain degree of market power could be 
identified in the post-deregulation era.  
 
Várhegyi (2003) applied a method similar to the Bresnahan model to the Hungarian banking 
sector (Coccorese, 2002). Investigating the lending market between 1995 and 2002, she arrived at 
the conclusion that there was no collusion. The banking sector was characterized by a state 
between perfect competition and Cournot equilibrium. Furthermore, she found that there had 
been strong price competition in lending during the period under review, and that credit demand 
responded sensitively to changes in the interest rate differences among banks. 
 
In our empirical analysis we apply the Bresnahan model to cover a wider segment of the 
Hungarian banking sector, including the loan and deposit markets, as well as consumer lending. 
Investigating the consumer credit market separately, we seek to find an answer as to whether 
comparatively very high lending margins, along with banks’ setting higher risk premia, also reflect 
banks’ non-competitive behaviour. 
 
3.2 Applying the Bresnahan model to measure the degree of comparison 
 
In the following we present the algebraic demonstration of the Bresnahan model. Then we go on 
to offer some major critical ideas about its applicability. Finally, we provide estimates of the 
degree of competition in various market segments and present our empirical results.  
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3.2.1 Theoretical demonstration of the Bresnahan model 
 
Assuming that there are N number of banks of identical size in the market, offering homogenous 
products, profit of bank i can be written in the following way:  
 
(1) , iiiiii FZQCPQ −−=Π ),(
 
where π denotes profit, P denotes price, Q denotes output, C denotes variable costs, Z is input 
prices and F denotes fixed costs. Furthermore, banks face the following inverse market demand 
curve: 
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where V is exogenous variables affecting demand. 
 
The first order condition for profit maximising of bank i gives:  
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Provided that each bank produces identical quantities, i.e. Q1=Q2=...=QN, then:  
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If, for instance, the average bank is perfectly competitive, then conjectural variation (λ) is zero. 
The reason for this is that if a bank increases its output, the other banks respond to this by jointly 
reducing theirs in an identical quantity. In this case, price and marginal cost are equal in a 
perfectly competitive market. In contrast, if there is perfect collusion, an increase in the output of 
one of the colluding market participants will generate an identical amount in the increase of 
output by the rest of the colluding banks. In this case the conjectural variation is 1, which means 
that colluding banks optimise output prices as if they were monopolists. Eventually, between the 
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two extremes, the conjectural variation in Cournot equilibrium will be 1/N for the average bank, 
as each bank expects that its competitors will not respond to any change in its own output.25  
 
The above method provides an unbiased estimate of the value of λ only if the product market is 
homogenous, and banks’ behaviour is identical. Owing to limited data availability, a number of 
empirical analyses, e.g. Shaffer (1993) and Shaffer and DiSalvo (1993) used total assets, as output, 
to measure the degree of bank competition. If, however, banks compete with each other in a 
number of product markets, the conjectural variation shows the average extent of market power 
in the various markets. The value of λ and any conclusion drawn from it may be misleading, as 
banks’ behaviour may be significantly different with respect to interest-bearing assets versus total 
loans or household lending versus corporate lending. Thus, our primary objective in determining 
the degree of competition is to provide estimates for the most homogenous markets, depending 
on data availability.  
 
It is equally important to note that banks may respond to competitors’ moves differently in a 
given market. It may be the case that some banks behave as if they were perfectly competitive, 
while others may behave as if they were oligopolists. In such a case, representing the average 
behaviour of market participants in a given market, the value λ may mask marked differences 
among individual banks. If individual bank data are available, this problem can be solved by 
allowing for the variation of λ across banks.  
 
Finally, the Bresnahan model discussed above presupposes that banks optimise profits26 
separately in the individual submarkets, i.e. banks are price setters in output markets, whereas 
they are price takers in input markets.27 According to Shaffer (1993), this hypothesis may hold for 
the labour and the capital market, since banks may well compete with a large number of other 
companies for input, both inside and outside the banking industry. In the case of the lending 
market, perfect competition is a less realistic hypothesis for inputs such as interest-bearing 
liabilities (deposits, securities etc.). If banks have market power with respect to interest-bearing 
liabilities, the value of λ will overestimate the actual degree of competition because market power 
in the two segments adds up. Such distortion can be eliminated only if interest-bearing liabilities 
are also examined in terms of competitive conditions. 
 
3.2.2 Lending and deposit market models  
 
In the section above, we pointed out that in order for the value of λ to be estimated, there should 
be an inverse demand curve and supply relationship derived from a profit maximisation function. 
In what follows we apply the Bresnahan model to the lending market. In defining the demand 
curve, we adopted the models of Shaffer (1993), Shaffer and DiSalvo (1993) and Bikker (2003). 
Bank i faces the credit demand function below:  
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25 In this case, banks consider market share to be their target variable, which corresponds to quantity-based 
competition.  
26 Empirical literature seems to be divided over whether banks optimise profits jointly or separately in the individual 
submarkets. 
27 The sections below reveal that in our model input prices include liabilities and wages in the case of the loan 
market, whereas they only include wages in the case of the deposit market.  
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In the equation QL denotes the size of the loan portfolio, PL is the lending rate, ZL denotes 
competitors’ lending rate, Y is GDP and u denotes an error term. The demand curve is made up 
of a linear and an interaction term; as a result, the sensitivity and elasticity of quantity vary from 
one explanatory variable to the next. This hypothesis is more realistic than models stipulating 
constant sensitivity and elasticity.28 It is important to note, however, that according to Lau (1982) 
and Bresnahan (1982), when a demand curve of this shape is used, λL can be identified only if the 
equation contains the endogenous price variable (PL) and the interaction terms with the rest of 
the variables (ZL, Y). Thus, estimates can only be provided if in equation (7) a1, a4 and a5 are 
significantly different from zero.  
 
In order to set the conditions for profit maximisation, based on the demand curve, we calculated 
the marginal revenue (MR) function.  
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then taking the first order condition with respect to quantity, and defining SI as bank i’s market 
share in a given market yields:  
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With MR defined, we selected the shape of the cost function. Our primary objective was to take 
the aspects of elasticity and the provision of a U-shape, appropriate for average and marginal 
costs, into account. Accordingly, like Shaffer (1993) and Coccorese (2002), we used a translog 
cost function.  
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This function uses two factor inputs, where C denotes total costs, I and W denote the two input 
prices, unit interest expense and unit wage cost respectively.  
 
Empirical studies often use capital as a third input factor in banks’ production and cost functions. 
A number of researchers, including Gilligan and Smirlock (1984), accept the hypothesis which 
supposes that the price of capital is fixed, thus marginal costs do not depend on unit capital cost. 
In contrast, Shaffer (1989) provided empirical evidence showing that considering the cost of 
capital as fixed is reasonable only in the case of cross-section samples and short time series. If the 
time series is longer, variable costs account for an increasingly large share of the cost of capital. 
                                                 
28 Coccorese’s log-linear form (2002), which presupposes constant elasticity, can also be employed as an alternative 
demand curve. 
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As the time series of the panel sample that we adopted can be regarded as short, we accept the 
hypothesis of the capital costs being fixed.  
 
Accordingly, as a next step, the MC function can be calculated with taking the first order 
condition of the translog cost function with respect to quantity in the following manner: 
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Based on equation (12), marginal cost (MC)29 can easily be expressed as the product of average 
cost (AC) and the quantity elasticity of costs. The latter is also referred to as scale efficiency 
factor.30  
 
Provided that bank i is a price taker in the market of input prices (in this case, in that of wages 
and financial liabilities), the lending rate can be determined on the basis of the following 
condition for profit maximisation (MR=MC):31 
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It follows that bank i’s lending rate is the sum of the product of λL and ‘mark-up’32 plus marginal 
cost.33 The higher the degree of competition, the lower is the lending rate, and vice versa. The λ 
for the loan market can be determined by estimating equations (7) and (13) simultaneously.  
 
The deposit market model can be worked out very similarly to the lending market model. 
Adopting Bikker’s method (2003), we defined the deposit supply function as follows: 
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Deposit supply (QD) is subject to deposit rates (PD), deposit rates set by competitors (ZD) and 
branch networks34 (B). Similarly to what was discussed above, λL can be identified only if the 
respective values of c1, c4 and c5 are other than zero. The marginal revenue function can be easily 
obtained from the supply curve: 
 
                                                 
29 The marginal cost function is linearly homogenous if b3 + b4 = 0.  
30 The quantity elasticity of costs is identical to scale efficiency. If the value of elasticity is 1, it follows from AC=MC 
that the firm’s output is at the minimum point of the average cost curve.  
31 The model presupposes that banks' risk perceptions of the individual instruments either do not change over time, 
or if they do, the directions of the changes are identical.  
32 The product of the derivative by quantity of the lending rate and quantity.  
33 λ is the coefficient of mark-up (mark-down). 
34 In the deposit supply function we used the number of branch offices rather than GDP, since the former leads to 
significant improvement in explanatory power.  
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Obviously, in the case of the deposit market, the marginal cost function contains only one input 
price: 
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It follows then that the condition for profit maximisation in the deposit market is:35 
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Bank i’s deposit rate is the sum of the product of λL and ‘mark-up’36 plus marginal cost. The 
higher the degree of competition, the higher the deposit rate, and vice versa. The λ for the 
deposit market can be determined by simultaneously estimating equations (14) and (17). 
 
The most important criterion is that the slope of the loan demand curve must be negative, 
whereas that of the deposit curve must be positive.37 Essentially, this means that the price 
sensitivity of quantity in the case of loans is below zero, whereas it is above zero38 in the case of 
deposits. Due to substitution, interest rates set by competitors correlate positively with loans and 
negatively with deposits. This follows from the assumption that, among the competing banks, the 
output of those which set the lowest market rate will rise, while that of those which set the lowest 
deposit rate will fall. Furthermore, an increase in GDP used as the proxy of income is likely to 
expand the loan portfolio of the banking sector through companies’ increased propensity to 
invest. By contrast, a higher number of branch offices may, due to spatial differentiation, lead to 
improved ability to collect deposits.39 
 
If there exists a supply relationship that sets the criteria for banks’ profit maximisation, the 
marginal cost will always be positive, which means that the elasticity of costs according to 
quantity is above zero. In the credit market, higher input prices, higher interest expenses and 
costlier labour justify higher lending rates. By contrast, a higher unit wage cost may account for 
lower deposit rates. Finally, as was pointed out earlier, λ should take a value within the [0,1] 
range. 
                                                 
35 This can be viewed as a profit maximisation condition, as banks may take the same investment decisions, and all of 
them have the opportunity to place funds in the interbank market. Accordingly, this is in fact both a cost 
minimisation condition and a profit maximisation condition in the deposit market. Under perfect competition, 
output at a maximum deposit rate ensures the MC=AC(=P) equality, i.e. the minimum value for AC. Consequently, 
the question is how much lower interest rate may evolve relative to this ideal state as a result of market power used 
by banks and how much cost saving can be achieved relative to perfect competition. 
36 The product of the derivative by quantity of the deposit rate and quantity. 
37 It is important to bear it in mind that we applied a model identical to the loan market one to all asset-side products, 
while one identical to the deposit market model to liability-side products. Thus, our expectations for the signs of the 
parameters of identical variables are, of course, identical.  
38 A loan demand curve with a negative slope: a1+a4ZL+a5Y<0. A deposit supply curve with a positive slope: 
c1+c4ZD+c5B>0.  
39 For details, see the description of Salop’s model of bank networks (1979). 
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3.3 Main features of the models for submarkets 
 
In defining the focus of our investigation, we had to choose, as a first step, the price variable that 
best suited our purposes. Fundamentally, there were two price variables to select from: interest 
rates for new business or on outstanding amounts. For theoretical and practical reasons, we 
decided on the average quarterly interest rates on outstanding amounts as derived from the 
balance sheet total and the income statement. The reason why we used this kind of inferred price 
variable rather than the interest rate for new business is that while the latter represents ex ante 
behaviour, the former represents average ex post decision, which is more consistent with the rest 
of the ex post variables pertaining to the same period. Furthermore, in an economic environment 
where there is relatively rapid interest rate convergence towards the euro-area level, interest rates 
for new business fail to satisfactorily reflect banks’ interest revenue targets. In fact, they 
undershoot them. Finally, loss of interest revenues attributable to default on payment is taken 
into account in the average quarterly interest rate on the outstanding amount. Accordingly, 
available individual bank data allowed us to estimate λ for interest-bearing assets, loans40 and 
consumer credit, as well as interest-bearing liabilities and deposits. Due to a lack of data, we were 
unable to investigate the corporate and household markets separately, and therefore we can only 
offer intuitive suggestions for these individual market segments.41 Table 4 gives an overview of 
the model variables with definitions.  
 
Table 4 Definitions of model variables 
 Assets (interest-bearing assets, total loans 
and consumer credit). 
Liabilities (interest-bearing liabilities 
and deposits) 
 
Q 
 
 
Average quarterly stock 
 
P 
 
 
Z 
 
Ratio of quarterly interest revenues to average stock 
 (quarterly interest rate earned on average stock) 
 
Competitors’ rates 
B 
 
- Number of branch offices 
Y Nominal GDP - 
AC 
 
 
Ratio of the sum of quarterly 
operating and interest expenses to 
total assets 
 
 
Ratio of quarterly operating 
expenses to total assets 
I 
 
Ratio of quarterly interest expenses 
to interest-bearing liabilities 
 
- 
W Ratio of quarterly wage expenses to staff 
 
We analysed the Hungarian banking sector by deriving the necessary data from the balance sheets 
and income statements of commercial banks. In order to obtain a long enough time series and a 
                                                 
40 Most of the housing loans are not represented among loans, as mortgage banks have not been included in the 
sample due to the shortness of the time series.  
41 Unfortunately, a breakdown of interest revenues by sectors is not available in the case of either loans or deposits. 
Loans mean non-bank loans, while deposits mean non-bank deposits.  
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cross-section of satisfactory size, we investigated 20 banks between December 1996 and 
September 2003. The only exception to this was consumer credit, in connection with which we 
used time series of 14 banks between March 2001 and September 2003. For the purposes of our 
analysis, we used seasonally adjusted quarterly data.  
 
The reason why we used separate models for increasingly shrinking market segments was to 
identify a λ that is homogenous, relative to models examining aggregate output. We were only 
able to do so partially, since we could not break down the cost function by market segments. 
Such shortcomings are attributable not only to data unavailability, but also to the fact that such 
separation is close to being impossible to achieve technically. Expenses in the individual market 
segments cannot, as a rule, be added as universal banks can operate ‘scope’ efficiently. Due to the 
complexity of other alternative methods, in estimating λ we employed the additional assumption 
that the level of average costs and unit input costs is identical in each market segment.42 We 
defined average costs as the ratio of total costs to total assets. 
 
As regards the models for submarkets and the variables used, two important remarks must be 
made. First, the rate of inflation in Hungary is rather high; thus inflation may have an explanatory 
power in the loan and deposit equations. Accordingly, we transformed all current price stock data 
into constant price figures43 using the GDP deflator. However, we did not deflate interest rates. 
In our judgement, there is economically sound reason to assume that, due to liquidity constraints, 
opportunity cost and the money illusion hypothesis, it is mainly nominal interest rates that affect 
loan demand and deposit supply.44  
 
Finally, it is important to note that we used identical models and identical numbers of variables 
and types of variable within both the assets and liabilities. There are, however, significant 
differences between assets and liabilities in terms of model specification. Therefore, the results 
are comparable only to a limited degree.  
 
3.4 Estimating the degree of competition 
 
As a first step, we determined the value of λ by measuring the degree of competition in three 
increasingly narrower submarkets. In order to estimate equations (7) and (13) simultaneously, we 
adopted the two-stage weighted least squares (2SWLS) method, which – according to Greene 
(1997) – is a simultaneous estimation of two equations, and which, if variables are endogenous, 
provides unbiased estimates for the values of the coefficients of variables.45 We used the one 
period lagged value of each variable as our list of instrumental variables. The value of each 
parameter was fixed in time and by cross-sections. Potential heteroscedasticity was mitigated by 
weighting with variances. Residuals obtained as final results revealed that autocorrelation was 
medium in the case of interest-bearing assets/liabilities and consumer credits, and low in the case 
of loans and deposits.46 
                                                 
42 Taking the role of ‘scope’ efficiency into account, Berg and Kim (1998) provided a joint rather than separate 
estimate for market segments.   
43 The model was also applied to nominal time series; however, the results for the value of λ were not qualitatively 
different. We obtained better results in respect of the fit and the significance of parameters.  
44 Liquidity constraints: the borrower takes the nominal interest rate into account in calculating the interest and 
instalment burden during a given period. Opportunity cost: alternative investments can be compared and assessed at 
a nominal level. Money illusion: erroneously, borrowers consider rising interest as loss, while depositors as increasing 
return, independently of the prevailing rate of inflation.  
45 In order to run the model, we used Eviews 4.1. 
46 We used correlograms (AC, PAC and Ljung-Box’s Q statistics) to test autocorrelation. 
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First, we examined whether the demand curve met the criteria and supported the assumptions 
outlined in the previous section. Table 5 reveals that, consistent with out expectations, the own-
price elasticity of demand is negative in all three markets.47 By contrast, in the market of 
consumer credit, the sign of the price elasticity of competitors was invariably positive. In keeping 
with our forecast, income elasticity also had a positive value. Overall, the value of λ can be 
identified, since the demand curve has the appropriate shape. 
 
Table 5 Major characteristics of the demand curve for assets48 
  
 
Interest-
bearing 
assets 
Loans Consumer 
credit 
Own-price elasticity - - - 
Competitors’ price elasticity  + + 0 
Income elasticity + + + 
’ +/- denotes positive/negative elasticity; 0 means that the relevant variable is unable to explain 
the quantity of output significantly.  
 
The estimated λ values reveal that, in the case of interest-bearing assets, competition in the 
‘aggregate’ market is high. At the same time, however, the hypothesis that there is perfect 
competition in the market can be ruled out, as the value of λ is significantly different from zero. 
In addition, the Cournot state does not hold true of interest-bearing assets either. If the Cournot 
state holds, the value of λ can be approximated by average market shares.49 With respect to 
interest-bearing assets, this Cournot point develops when λ is 0.05, which is much higher than 
our estimated value of 0.008. A further analysis of our empirical results unambiguously reveals 
that the value of λ in the increasingly narrower market segments of loans and consumer credit is 
significantly different from that in the case of interest-bearing assets. This means that no 
conclusive inference about market segments can be drawn based on aggregate measures of 
output (like interest-bearing assets).  
 
Both perfect competition (λ=0) and perfect collusion (λ=1), the two extreme states of 
competition, can be ruled out in the lending market. The estimated value of λ in the loan market 
is higher than that in the case of interest-bearing assets. Nevertheless, the degree of competition 
is higher than in Cournot equilibrium. In the credit market, too, this Cournot point develops 
when λ is 0.05, which is higher than our estimated value of 0.04. Thus, though the degree of 
competition is lower in the credit market than in that of interest-bearing instruments, banking 
behaviour is still more competitive than the Cournot level.  
 
Of the three levels of aggregation, the market of consumer credit turned out to be the least 
competitive. Both perfect competition and perfect collusion can be ruled out in consumer 
lending. However, we cannot rule out weaker competition than the Cournot state. In this market 
a Cournot state develops if λ reaches 0.071, i.e. the average market share. In this case, however, 
                                                 
47 The signs of elasticity were invariably calculated from the derivation of demand function according to the adequate 
variables.  
48 It is very important to bear it in mind that we assessed only one section of both the demand and supply curves for 
available output quantities (i.e. those during the period referred to); thus, there may be modifications in the shape of 
the curves if such output is included in the sample that does not feature in it. It should be emphasised that, based on 
these factors, results cannot be used to provide the entire length of either the demand or supply curve. 
49 Obviously, in this case the value of λ is 1/N, as our assumption is that our pattern covers the entire banking 
sector. 
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the value (0.20) of λ that we calculated well exceeds this reference value. Based on this, it is safe 
to say that the degree of competition in the consumer credit market is lower than in Cournot 
equilibrium. Finally, it may be worth noting that, based on the results, competitors’ rates of 
interest have no significant explanatory power for developments in output. This alone may imply 
the lower degree of competition. According to Cournot’s competitive behaviour, each bank 
assumes that competitors do not respond to, for instance, the changes in its interest rates. This 
explains why competitors’ rates of interest fail to offer an explanation for changes in the output 
in the market of consumer lending. Another likely explanation is that, if competition is weaker 
than that in a state of Cournot equilibrium, banks can be characterised with a certain level (tacit 
or deliberate) of collusion. 
  
Table 6 Estimation results for the asset-side 
 Interest-bearing 
assets 
Loans Consumer credit 
a1 -254,100*** -277,169*** -55,824** 
 (-3.19) (-8.48) (-2.19) 
a2 -173,812*** 753,881*** 71,253 
 (-4.74) (9.05) (0.00) 
a3 -0.312*** 0.180*** 0.048** 
 (-3.57) (6.92) (2.11) 
a4 20,080*** 23,296*** 1,163* 
 (3.16) (9.30) (1.75) 
a5 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.025* 
 (3.20) (5.70) (1.91) 
a6 0.096*** -0.496*** -0.035* 
 (3.58) (-13.30) (-1.69) 
b1 1.106*** 1.590*** 2.437*** 
 (4.87) (6.25) (5.66) 
b2 -0.003*** -0.046*** -0.014*** 
 (-4.99) (-3.04) (-11.10) 
b3 -0.006** -0.072*** -0.141*** 
 (-2.29) (-10.25) (-14.20) 
b4 0.032*** 0.210*** 0.053** 
 (9.53) (12.26) (2.37) 
λ 0.008** 0.042*** 0.203** 
 (2.31) (3.86) (2.28) 
N 560 560 154 
R2(1) 0.71 0.76 0.39 
R2(2) 0.74 0.84 0.44 
    
’*,**,*** at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. 
’’ With t statistics in parenthesis.  
’’’ R2(1) is demand equation (7), while R2(2) is the multiple-determinant coefficient of supply equation 
(13). 
 
Despite the lack of required data for investigating the market of corporate lending, an intuitive 
suggestion can be offered for the competition in this market segment. Between December 1996 
and September 2003 corporate loans accounted for the overwhelming majority (82%) of the 
loans granted by the Hungarian banking sector; a smaller portion (13%) involved lending to 
households, and a mere 5% was lending to the government and other sectors. Fundamentally, an 
aggregate λ is the weighted average of the degree of competition in the individual market 
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segments. Based on the above breakdown, corporate lending was predominant in the period 
under review. Thus, the degree of competition should be similar to that in total lending.  
  
As our next step, we estimated equations (14) and (17) simultaneously. In the case of liabilities, 
we first examined the shape of the deposit supply curve. As shown in table 7, the slope of the 
deposit supply function is positive, as the own-price elasticity is above zero. In this case, the price 
elasticity of competitors is negative, since higher deposit rates offered by competitors reduce the 
stock of deposits of a given bank. Finally, consistent with our expectations, the number of branch 
offices is positively correlated with output. Thus, given the necessary characteristics of the supply 
curve, the liabilities side value of λ can be identified. 
 
Table 7 Main characteristics of the liabilities-side supply curve 
  Interest-bearing 
liabilities 
Deposits 
Own-price elasticity + + 
Competitors’ price elasticity  - - 
Branch office elasticity + + 
’ +/- denotes positive/negative elasticity; 0 means that the relevant variable is unable to explain 
the quantity of output significantly. 
 
In the case of interest-bearing liabilities, the value of λ does not depart from zero significantly, 
which suggests that, overall, there may be perfect competition in the market of liabilities, with 
interest as a given for banks. This is hardly surprising, seeing that the majority of the banks in 
Hungary dispose over a considerable amount of foreign and domestic interbank liabilities. In 
view of this, it should also be added that the asset-side estimate of λ is unbiased, since our 
assumption that banks are price-takers in the case of interest-bearing liabilities has been justified. 
 
However, the hypothesis of perfect competition is rejected for the deposit market. The value of λ 
is 0.03, which means that the degree of competition in the deposit market lies between perfect 
competition (λ=0) and monopoly (λ=1). Furthermore, it is equally safe to say that the degree of 
competition is higher in the deposit market than in a Cournot state (λ=0,05). As the largest share 
(70%) of total deposits comprises household deposits and as concentration is very low in the 
more modest corporate segment, it is equally safe to assume that the degree of competition in the 
market of household deposits is lower than that in the market of aggregate deposits.  
 
Finally, in the case of loans and deposits, we added a dummy variable to equations (13) and (17) 
in order to measure changes in the degree of competition over time.50 The time effect proved to 
be significant in both markets. Based on the results, we propose that in the period under review 
the degree of competition decreased in lending and grew in deposit-taking. In the case of the loan 
market this can be explained by the growing proportion of household lending, which is more 
concentrated than corporate lending. In the case of deposits, a decline in the concentration of the 
household market segment and a deterioration in households’ propensity to save over the past 
two years are likely to have contributed to more intense competition. 
 
                                                 
50 Fundamentally, we added a term to equations (13) and (17) in which the dummy variable was multiplied by the 
mark-up, mark-down and the coefficients of the temporal impact. The coefficients of the temporal impact denotes 
changes in the degree of competition. Relying on the results of break tests, the dummy takes the value of 1 from 
December 1996 to December 2000 and takes 0 between March 2000 and September 2003. In the case of deposits, 
the dummy takes the value of 1 from December 1996 to December 2001 and takes 0 between March 2002 and 
September 2003. 
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Table 8 Estimation results for the liabilities-side 
 Interest-bearing liabilities Deposits 
c1 3,431*** 18,366*** 
 (2.62) (5.48) 
c2 -5,022*** 5,660*** 
 (-8.78) (3.08) 
c3 512.45*** 694.52*** 
 (4.91) (7.98) 
c4 -504.67** -5,459*** 
 (-2.30) (-5.32) 
c5 70.24*** 280.48*** 
 (2.90) (5.48) 
c6 -76.50*** -189.30*** 
 (-3.22) (-7.68) 
d1 2.219*** 1.272*** 
 (7.56) (7.32) 
d2 -0.107*** -0.054*** 
 (-2.96) (-3.35) 
d3 -0.651*** -0.792*** 
 (-17.42) (-10.81) 
λ -0.001 0.031** 
 (-1.02) (2.29) 
N 560 560 
R2(1) 0.48 0.51 
R2(2) 0.50 0.54 
   
’ *,**,*** At 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. 
’’ With t statistics in parenthesis.  
’’’ R2(1) is a multiple-determinant coefficient of demand equation (14), while R2(2) is that of 
supply equation (17). 
 
3.5 Striving to define the extent of welfare loss and market power 
  
In the following section, we seek to calculate the amount of welfare losses incurred to customers 
by the Hungarian banking sector through less competitive pricing than in the case of perfect 
competition. Such losses arise from dead weight losses, lower output than in the case of perfect 
competition and banks’ extra profits earned through higher prices. Our study endeavours to 
calculate the latter, which bears relevance to consumer welfare and financial stability. Assuming 
non-competitive pricing, we seek to provide an estimate for that portion of additional losses 
incurred to consumers that are converted into producer (or, in our case, bank) surplus.51 
 
(18) QPP *−=WL  
 
In equation (18) WL denotes additional losses incurred to consumers, P denotes actual interest 
rate, P* denotes the interest rate in perfect competition and Q denotes output.  
 
We tested consumer surplus losses for loans and deposits as they best represent welfare losses 
                                                 
51 Obviously, on the level of society (banks and other sectors), these two impacts neutralise each other; thus, in 
effect, only dead-weight losses mean welfare losses.  
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caused to the resident non-bank sector. The share of the non-resident sector is rather small (6%–
7%) in these markets, and, compared to interest-bearing assets and liabilities, these aggregates do 
not include interbank loans and deposits or other instruments which bear market or fixed rates 
(e.g. securities or central bank deposits).  
 
In providing an estimate for consumer surplus losses, as a first step, we calculated the product of 
λ and mark-up (mark-down) for each bank. Then, we provided the weighted averages of profit 
margins in both loan and deposit markets. The annual weighted average interest premium 
attributable to imperfect competition has been 80 and 140 basis points for the loan and deposit 
markets respectively over the past seven years. This may appear surprising, as the value of λ is 
lower in the case of the deposit market. Thus, the only plausible explanation for a higher interest 
premium is that the average weighted mark-down for deposits is higher than the mark-up for 
loans, i.e. either concentration is higher or the price elasticity of demand is lower in the deposit 
market than in the loan market.  
 
As a second step, using average interest rate premia between December 1996 and September 
2003, we calculated the forint value of the annual average consumer surplus losses as a 
proportion of average loans and deposits. Our estimates, expressed as a percentage of GDP, for 
losses in consumer surplus arising from non-competitive pricing of banks are 0.24% for loans 
and 0.51% for deposits. Based on our calculations, overall, the Hungarian banking sector 
incurred an annual average welfare loss of approximately 0.7%–0.8% as a proportion of GDP 
vis-à-vis its customers over the past seven years.  
 
Finally, we believe that it is important to compare loan, consumer credit and deposit markets in 
terms of the extent of market power. It follows from banks’ profitability and related strategic 
considerations that it is the extent of market power rather than the degree of competition alone 
that matters. Banks’ non-competitive behaviour is only one source of market power, the other 
being price elasticity characterising a given market.  
 
Interest rate premia indicating market power can be defined as the product of the degree of 
competition and mark-up or mark-down (or somewhat more simply, ‘interest premia’ = P - 
MC). Relative market power can be measured with the Lerner index, which is the ratio of 
interest premia and nominal interest rates. The Lerner index can easily be derived from equations 
(13) and (17): 
 
(19) ε
λ=−=−
P
MCP
indexLerner
 , where Q
P
P
Q
∂
∂=ε
. 
 
In equation (19) ε denotes the price elasticity of loan demand and deposit supply. 1/ε denotes 
the largest extent of market power that banks can exploit in a given market. λ denotes the actual 
proportion of market power that, subject to the degree of competition, banks are able to use. For 
instance, in case of a monopoly or perfect collusion, banks can exploit the full extent of their 
market power. By contrast, under perfect competition, market participants can earn no 
oligopolistic rents. Thus, the Lerner index measures the extent to which market power is utilised.  
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Table 9 Market power by submarkets 
 λ Interest premia Lerner index 
Loans 4.2 0.7 3.8 
Consumer credit 20.3 4.4 20.5 
Deposits 3.1 1 8.4 
’ λ, interest rate premia and the Lerner index denote unweighted banking system average. 
’’ Values to be interpreted as percentages. 
Table 9 reveals that the degree of competition is the lowest in the consumer credit market, which, 
coupled with price elasticity lower than that in the loan market, results in very high interest 
premia. According to the Lerner index, monopoly power is the strongest in the market of 
consumer credit. Although, based on the value of λ, competition appears to be strongest in the 
deposit market, it is the second most profitable market in terms of the nominal (Interest premia) 
and relative (Lerner-index) extent of market power. Allowing for the volume impact as well, it is 
easy to see that, in terms of income, the most attractive market is deposit-taking.52 Interest rate 
premia and the Lerner index, and hence market power, are the lowest in lending.53 Given the 
sectoral breakdown of the three market segments, the results underpin our earlier hypothesis that 
banks’ market power is higher in the household market than in the corporate market.54  
 
3.6 Sensitivity of results to banks’ costs and risks 
  
However, the results of measuring the degree of competition and market power must be treated 
with caution, especially in such markets where costs and credit risks exceed banks’ average costs 
and credit risks. With respect to costs, we assumed that a given bank’s unit interest expenses and 
unit wage costs were the same in all market segments. This assumption can be regarded as 
realistic. By contrast, the homogeneity of average costs, particularly in the market of consumer 
credit, is not a realistic assumption. In the Hungarian banking sector, at 14%–18%, average costs 
as a proportion of their total assets of small banks specialising mainly in consumer lending are 
approximately twice as high as the banking sector average of 9%. Based on this, we tested the 
sensitivity of consumer credit-related results to the level of average costs. Our sensitivity analysis 
revealed that neither the degree of competition, nor the level of market power had changed 
significantly when average costs doubled. Marginal costs even remained unchanged. An increase 
in average costs resulted in a significant reduction in the scale efficiency term.55 Based on this, we 
assert that results are not sensitive to our assumptions for the cost curve.  
 
When risks are examined, a similar issue may arise, particularly when results related to market 
power are evaluated. In fact, it may well be the case that, in addition to the degree of competition 
and price elasticity, the default risk can also provide an explanation for estimated interest premia 
on loans, chiefly on consumer credit. Our model allowed for credit risks only partially.56,57 We 
                                                 
52 This, however, only holds true for those banks that are already in the market. Developing branches reduced the 
profit margin of new entrants significantly. 
53 According to the calculations of Angelini and Cetorelli (1999), the Lerner index for bank assets was around 20% in 
Italy between 1984 and 1992; by 1997 it had fallen below 7%. Based on this, market power in the Hungarian loan 
market cannot be considered as very low.  
54 The household sector accounts for 100% of consumer credit and 70% of deposits. The corporate sector accounts 
for over 80% of total loans. 
55 The value of the size efficiency term fell below 1, which is a more realistic result in the case of a new market 
segment.  
56 We did not allow for loan write-offs, owing to their low level. 
57 The reason for this is there were no available data on the rate of losses of the individual banks either in the market 
as a whole or in the individual market segments.  
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incorporated losses in interest revenues from default on payment, but excluded expected losses in 
capital from it. The latter factor is difficult to quantify. In our opinion, the best possible proxy is 
the ratio of loan loss provisioning to the gross amount of loans over a given period of time.58 
With respect to the banks under review, this was negligible in the case of loans (0.1% to 0.2%). 
Thus we have every reason to exclude the risk of default on payment. As regards consumer 
credit, however, it is important to take into account the risks arising from losses in capital. Over 
the past three years, loan loss provisioning as a percentage of the loan portfolio has been 1% to 
1.5%.59 This suggests that close to one-third or one-quarter of the 4.4% risk premium on 
consumer credit should have arisen from higher risk-taking. Obviously, it cannot be ruled out 
that domestic banks have, owing to the ‘young age’ of the portfolio, charged higher risk premia, 
chiefly in consumer lending, over the past few years. Due, however, to the low level of actual 
loan losses in the period under review, this has been transformed into oligopolistic profits. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
Adopting the Bresnahan model, this study aimed to determine the degree of competition in the 
Hungarian banking sector. We set up equilibrium models, which we applied to markets with 
various degrees of aggregation. To measure the degree of competition, we estimated conjectural 
variation (λ) for each of these markets.. Our empirical study of the banking sector in Hungary 
included interest-bearing assets, loans, interest-bearing liabilities and deposits, covering the period 
between December 1996 and September 2003. In respect of consumer credit, we analysed a panel 
sample for a shorter time horizon, i.e. the period between March 2001 and September 2003. In 
addition to measuring the degree of competition for the main submarkets of the Hungarian 
banking system, we also provided evidence that, if using total assets as an output measure, a 
distorted conclusion might be drawn concerning the degree of competition in the individual 
submarkets. 
 
We further proved that, although the degree of competition can be considered to be very high in 
the case of interest-bearing assets in Hungary, banks’ behaviour is not perfectly competitive. As 
regards loans, however, it is safe to say that the degree of competition is lower in lending than in 
the case of interest-bearing assets, with banks being more competitive than in the Cournot state. 
It is important to point out that our results are in line with that of Várhegyi (2003), i.e. in 
Hungary the degree of competition in lending is between the Cournot state and perfect 
competition. The degree of competition in the loan markets does not differ markedly from that 
in the banking sectors of other countries. Bikker (2003), for instance, arrived at the conclusion 
that the degree of competition had approximated the Cournot equilibrium only in the UK. In 
other countries, the estimated λ values suggested either perfect competition (Italy, The 
Netherlands, Belgium and France), or, similarly to what is experienced in Hungary, competition 
was in between perfect competition and the Cournot equilibrium (Germany, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden). Our calculations reveal that in Hungary intense competition in lending has led to 
relatively small market power, as measured by the Lerner index. Compared to Angelini and 
Cetorelli’s study on Italy (1999), the market power that Hungarian banks exploit in the loan 
market cannot be considered very low.  
 
Contrary to the lending market as a whole, the degree of competition is rather low in the 
                                                 
58 This value somewhat overshoots the amount of losses arising from default on payment of the principal, since it 
jointly represents default on payment of interest and that on loans, already taken into account.  
59 As data on provisioning are only available for total loans, with no sectoral breakdown, this value was calculated 
from the respective income statements of such banks that are specialized in consumer lending. 
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consumer credit market. In fact, banks’ pricing behaviour proved to be more oligopolistic than in 
the Cournot equilibrium. Furthermore, we provided evidence showing that a low level of 
competition, coupled with a relatively low price elasticity of demand, had allowed banks to earn 
high oligopolistic rents over the past three years. This, in turn, means that, mainly due to high 
profit margins and low entry costs, consumer lending is one of the most profitable market 
segments for banks in Hungary. It follows that competition in this segment is likely to become 
increasingly intense in the future.  
 
Based on our results, the perfect competition hypothesis cannot be rejected for interest-bearing 
liabilities. This is likely to be attributable to the fact that Hungarian banks have significant foreign 
and interbank liabilities. By contrast, we ruled out perfectly competitive pricing in the deposit 
market. We further realised that the degree of competition was higher than in a Cournot state. 
However, competition is weaker in the deposit market in Hungary than in the EU. Bikker (2003) 
arrived at the conclusion that banks were near-perfect competitors in the deposit markets of the 
EU. Competition in between perfect competition and the Cournot state, as in Hungary, has only 
been found for Germany and Spain. It is also important to add that, despite a relatively high 
degree of competition, banks have had substantial market power in the domestic deposit market 
over the past seven years, owing possibly to the low elasticity of supply. Based on international 
comparisons and due to high profit margins, we expect competition to increase in the deposit 
market, and in the household deposit market in particular. Nevertheless, we think that, because 
of high entry costs (e.g. those associated with establishing branches), the dynamics of increase in 
competition will only be moderate. 
 
We also sought to define the welfare losses incurred by banks vis-à-vis customers. In our 
estimation, for the loan and deposit markets combined, losses in consumer surplus arising from 
the fact that the pricing of banks was not perfectly competitive amounted to an annual average of 
0.7%–0.8% of GDP between December 1996 and September 2003. Banks caused 0.24% and 
0.51% welfare losses in the loan and deposit market respectively during the period under review. 
Judging from similar empirical studies, it is safe to say that the Hungarian banking sector does 
not seem to have caused high welfare losses to customers. Oxenstierna (1999) found that the 
Swedish banking system had caused a 1.1% loss as a proportion of GDP in consumer surplus 
between 1989 and 1997. Non-competitive pricing led to 0.2% and 0.9% loss in welfare for the 
loan market and deposit market respectively. This comparison is, however, rather distorted by the 
fact that financial intermediation in Sweden is much deeper than in Hungary. Taking this into 
account, the loss in consumer surplus caused by the Hungarian banking sector no longer seems 
low.  
 
Nevertheless, owing to the trade-off between financial stability and welfare losses incurred to 
customers, banks’ non-competitive pricing cannot always be considered unfavourable. If higher 
interest income is not used to finance operational inefficiency, then banks’ improving profitability 
may contribute to stronger financial stability. According to the quiet life hypothesis presented by 
Berger and Hannan (1998), the management of banks with stronger market power pays less 
attention to efficiency as the use of pricing power ‘automatically’ increases revenues. Thus, larger 
market power results in lower efficiency. In this case, the utilisation of market power causes 
welfare losses through financing inefficient operations, with no improvement in financial stability 
at all. It is easy to see that in Hungary high oligopolistic profits arising from pricing are in fact 
associated with high profitability, i.e. the utilisation of market power does not finance inefficient 
operation as a whole. However, it cannot be ruled out that banks’ non-competitive pricing 
behaviour and resultant management behaviour generate some degree of inefficiency. Therefore, 
future research should focus on the role of efficiency factors in banks’ performance. A detailed 
investigation of the impact of X-, scope and scale efficiency on banks’ pricing and profitability 
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may represent a major step towards a better understanding of the operation of the banking 
system. 
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